In a climatic scene from first-time author Baer’s book, the former Central Intelligence Agency case officer watches as Kurdish guerillas run roughshod over a key army division of Saddam Hussein’s forces in March 1995, while trying to communicate with Washington. As artillery barrages roar in the foothills of northern Iraq, the reports officer who Baer must liaison with is not impressed. Baer sends a detailed report on the night’s crushing victory for the guerillas, and receives a reply that had become familiar to him: “We picked up some collateral intelligence.” As far as HQ was concerned, according to Baer, “If the big eye in the sky didn’t see it, it didn’t happen.”
The military coup is aborted by US National Security Council chief Tony Lake, and Baer barely escapes back to Turkey. This was the US government’s last best chance to overthrow the troublesome regime of Saddam Hussein, and no similar attempt has been made since.
See No Evil is both a thrilling travelogue, a taut spy yarn, and a damning bit of investigative reporting into the decisions and events that “de-fanged and dispirited” the Central Intelligence Agency; the negligence and misallocation that was driven home on the morning of September 11, 2001. Baer comes off as two parts John Wayne and one part Bob Woodward. Legendary muckraker Seymour Hersh, who did his share of whistle blowing directed at the CIA, writes the foreword, where he refers to Baer as “perhaps the best on-the-ground field officer in the Middle East.”
The story of Baer’s involvement in what was once one of the most feared institutions in the world is an amusing and improbable one. As a young man just out of Georgetown’s International Affairs program, with lackluster academic standing and looking for some line of work that would allow him to continue his life as a part-time ski bum, Baer thought the CIA was his ticket.
“I’d finagle an assignment to Switzerland, meet from time to time with one of those shady agents. . .and spend the rest of my time on the ski slopes,” Baer writes after learning of his acceptance into the Directorate of Operations, the clandestine arm of the agency.
He is promptly thrust headfirst into the fast-paced, sensitive and dangerous world of “human intelligence.” As a representative of an agency whose main job was “breaking the law — foreign law, but still the law,” Baer learned fast that to succeed took much more than a bad attitude and a Walther PPK, but also fast footwork, a persuasive demeanor, and knowing who to take care of and trust. His tales of being a green agent at posts in 1970s India are filled with typical but engrossing stories of back doors, car chases, and narrow escapes.
The rest of the first half of the book follows Baer to “places most Americans will never travel to,” and provides a first person view of international terrorism.
In Beirut, Baer confronts the sources that fermented a maelstrom of violence that America became entangled with in the early 1980s: the bombings of both the American embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983, the resolution of which becomes a personal crusade. We find him spending years in the remote mountains of Tajikistan, a former Soviet republic, playing target practice, driving Soviet tanks, and drinking vodka with former Russian Colonels.
As the book progresses, the CIA slowly changes from an elite intelligence corps to a dysfunctional and hopelessly political machine. The reader is exposed to laughable lapses in judgment that would be flagged at any workplace. Field reports are ignored, risks are minimized, satellites become the eyes and ears of the CIA, and station chiefs become more and more concerned with keeping things calm than addressing possible threats. In 1986, Baer meets with members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to discuss an alliance against Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Shortly after a report was filed, the State Department told Baer they weren’t interested (only to find out years later, in September 2001, that one of the contacts was an associate of Al-Qaeda).
The most stupefying segment comes when Baer must return to Washington DC, a place far more dangerous and slimy, it turns out, than the most isolated corners of Lebanon. Baer finds himself caught up in petty politics, a murder investigation by the FBI (an apparent assassination attempt on a foreign leader), and raising the ire of the “team players” at the agency who saw Baer’s cavalier attitude as a liability.
In Baer’s eyes, the CIA forgot its mission as the successor to the World War II era Office of Strategic Services: to protect America and American citizens. By amputating troublesome agents, not taking risks, and not reevaluating the threats facing America after the end of the Cold War, it failed miserably in its duty, and he lets you know he is very upset (he frequently appears on guest panels on MSNBC’s Nightly News program to drive home his points). With America now looking over its shoulder every day, Baer’s words evince an urgency in terms of America’s ability to protect its citizens and fight terror. If the CIA has the willpower to change itself in a hurry, Baer cynically seems to suggest, it will only do it with the help of vigilant public scrutiny.
This article appears in Jun 26 – Jul 2, 2002.
